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Introduction 
The period from 1992 to 2000 was one of the most dramatic in the Russian 
history. It was the end of the existence of the USSR and the long opposition with 
the West called the Cold War. At that time global reforms in the economy, state 
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ABSTRACT 
The importance of the studied problem is caused by the USA’s leading role in the 
development of modern world order and the economy, its influence in the international 
economic organizations. The article is aimed at revealing the reasons of choosing 
neoliberal strategy for Russian reforms, the amount and results of the American financial 
and technical aid to these reforms.  The leading approach of researching this problem is 
the complex one. It allows finding out economic, internal political, geopolitical and 
cultural factors which influenced the implementation and the results of the American 
assistance to the Russian reforms. Authors draw a conclusion about considerable 
influence of the USA on domestic policy of Russia in the early nineties of the XX century. 
The amount and the content of the American financial and technical assistance to the 
Russian government are analyzed. Promises of massive financial aid from the 
international economic organizations and the USA were realized partially and much later, 
than it was necessary for economic transformations. The article’s content and 
conclusions can be used in other scientific works on American-Russian relations history, 
Modern history of Russia, during elaboration the effective strategy of reforms for the 
countries which are in a condition of a transitional economy. 
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administration and the political system as a whole were held. The subject of the 
article concerns the role of the United States, American technical and financial 
assistance in carrying out transformations, their possible «designers», 
alternative scenarios of economic reforms in Russia and the influence of the US 
assistance on the development of bilateral relations in this period. The study of 
the American assistance in carrying out Russian reforms is particularly relevant 
in the light of the patronage of IMF and the USA upon the macroeconomic 
transformations in Ukraine. 
It is necessary to mention that the problems of the American-Russian 
relations at the end of XX century received significant coverage. Many Russian 
researchers thought that the main cause of the unstable political relations 
between Russia and the US was inefficient economic cooperation (Batalov & 
Kremenyuk, 2002; Shakleina, 2006; Utkin, 2003; Bogdanov, 2015).  
American political analysts J. Nye (2002) & D. Papp (1997) stressed the 
weakness of the Russian foreign policy resources. Russia was the passive party 
in the American-Russian relations in the 1990-s, while the United States got a 
chance to use their power in the construction of a new model of the world. 
According to S. Cohen (2000), the results of the US policy towards Russia were 
disappointing. He accused the Clinton administration in uninformed and poorly 
designed intervention into the Russian transition to democracy and market 
economy (Cohen, 2000).  
It should be noted that the important aspects of the internal political 
struggle which has taken place in both countries and which greatly influenced 
on the foreign policy decisions often escaped from the researchers. On the 
contrary, great attention to internal factors was paid by S. Y. Shenin (2008a; 
2010) in his monograph dedicated to American assistance to Russia in 90-s of 
the XX century (Retur, 2008) and in several articles. 
Much more attention was given to American policy towards Russian 
reforms by foreign researchers. In particular, the British scientists M. Cox 
(2000), P. Rutland (2012) described the specificity of the "shock therapy" and 
changes in the Russian society attitudes towards pro-Western policy of Boris 
Yeltsin. Besides, the work of the Nobel Prize winner for economics J.E. Stiglitz 
(2002) is of great importance. He analyzed the results of market reforms in 
Russia in the context of the world economy globalization. 
Unfortunately, existing research papers do not contain the question 
concerning insignificant, but, nevertheless, important positive experience in the 
development of the American-Russian relations at the regional level. 
So, three questions require investigation: the US role in Russia's transition 
to democracy and a market economy; the volume and the content of the 
American financial and technical assistance to the Russian government; the 
factors which determined the failure of market reforms in Russia and the cooling 
of the American-Russian relations in the 90-s of the XX century. 
Methodological Framework  
To clarify all these questions we used the analysis of statistical information, 
biographical material. The authors developed a wide range of sources including 
periodicals, reports of the United States General Accounting Office, the 
American-Russian bilateral documents and agreements of the involved period. 
The main methodological approach used in the study is a complex one, which 
 
 
 
 
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL & SCIENCE EDUCATION  7705 
 
 
 
 
 
 
allows considering the implementation of the American financial and technical 
assistance to Russian reforms in dynamics, in the system of relations with other 
phenomena of the Russian and American reality. 
Results and Discussions  
In the early 1990s, changes in the political system and the economy were of 
great necessity for Russia. However, any changes require considerable 
resources. The government of the new state had no such funds. The economic 
potential of the country was broken. Based on the statistical services data of the 
CIS the report of Goskomstat contained the following: "in 1991, in the economy 
of all Commonwealth States ... the drop in production had a widespread 
character. It was directly determined by the destruction of the common economic 
space, the breaks of multi-sided industrial relations of sectors and regions, 
which had been developing for decades" (The Economy of Member 
Countries...1992). Despite the fact that Russia had maintained a dominant role 
among the CIS countries-members, its production declined by 19% in 1992 
compared to the previous year. 
In addition, as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, Russia had to service 
the multi-billion debt to the West countries. Established in the years of the cold 
war, massive military-industrial complex needed a partial conversion and 
modernization. Overall, the country faced a need of accelerated catch-up 
development of Western Europe countries and the United States. 
In these circumstances it was necessary to enlist the help. Western partners 
who were the opponents in the cold war had to help the government of the new 
Russian President B. N. Yeltsin not only in overcoming economic difficulties. 
The help from the West was supposed to play an important role in supporting 
the authority of the President Yeltsin in the country, and to show that Russia, 
despite its temporary difficulties, was waited for in the community of developed 
countries, countries-leaders. 
Formally, the international economic organizations - the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had to give the main financial and 
technical assistance to Russia. They were depending on the support of the 
countries from the Group of 7. However, the international financial institutions 
such as the IMF and the World Bank were influenced by the USA. It was 
Washington where Boris Yeltsin addressed in search of support and assistance.  
The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international 
economic organizations have provided assistance to the countries with transition 
economies on certain conditions, being, therefore, not only the guarantee of the 
stability in the world economy, but also the conductor of the globalization 
politics in the interests of its leaders – the USA, Western Europe and Japan. 
The content of the reforms was inherently neoliberal. Neoliberalism is more 
widely interpreted as a political philosophy and not as an economic strategy. 
Nevertheless, the neoliberal approach involves the reduction of state 
intervention into the economy, the expansion of economic and political freedom 
of the person, and trade liberalization. P. Rutland (2013), considering the choice 
alternatives of the Russian reforms strategy, came to the conclusion that all 
possible options were anyway versions of the Washington consensus. The money 
was appropriated for this scenario. It was determined by the historically 
established ideas about the economy development in that period. 
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The program was not easy. The ability to remain in power in the process of 
carrying out such reforms was mainly determined by the massive financial 
support which could mitigate the inevitable costs in the form of inflation, 
unemployment, cuts of government subsidies. In addition, the reforms had to be 
conducted rapidly so that the first positive results of the work of the capitalism 
in Russia provided a favorable outcome of all events. The strategy of fast and 
complex economic reforms which had already been implemented in several 
countries was called the "shock therapy". 
The quick and positive result was promised by the specialists of Harvard 
University, who arrived in Moscow in September 1991, - Jeffrey Sachs and 
Anders Åslund, to whom later David Lipton joined (Aslund, 2002; Sachs, 1997). 
The head of this group, Jeffrey Sachs, Professor of Harvard University, had a 
successful experience of economic reforms in Bolivia and Poland. Anders Aslund 
(2002) specialized in the study of Russian economy and politics. David Lipton 
was a graduate of Harvard University and a member of the IMF, what increased 
the credibility of American "anti-crisis managers" even more (Aslund, 2002). 
The issue was in the monetary resources. By estimate of J. Sachs (1997), for 
a favorable outcome of the reforms Russia needed Western aid in the amount of 
15 to 20 billion dollars annually for the first five years until the stable economic 
growth (Shenin, 2010). However, the notion that the West was ready to provide 
financial aid had dissipated very quickly. 
In early 1992, the economic reforms in Russia were started. Western 
consultants and local economists Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais tried to 
implement market reforms as quickly as possible (Gaidar, 1996). The prices 
were freed, the domestic market was opened for import. The prices increased 
with inﬂation running at 2525 percent by the end of 1992 (Table 1). Inflation, as 
expected, evaporate money overhang (excess money that was accumulated by 
the population and was not provided with the mass of commodities). However, 
despite the expectations it did not lead to a production recovery, because at the 
same time, the market was full of imports. 
J. Sachs insistently sought for the Western aid. “Shock therapy” could not 
be successful without the massive financial injections. In April 1992, the US 
President George Bush and the German Chancellor Kohl (on behalf of EU) 
announced the decision about the aid package to Russia amounting to $24 
billion, the leaders of the G-7 approved 20 billion more for the aid to the other 
republics of the Soviet Union (Shenin, 2008b). However, these promises were not 
implemented. The US electorate traditionally disapproved the issues of spending 
their money on some alien needs, for example to support democracy in Russia. 
In conditions of the upcoming presidential elections, George Bush did not insist 
on the Congress adoption of those packages that had been already announced.  
Meanwhile, the plan of the fast and radical reforms could not be 
implemented. A catastrophic drop in the living standards enlivened the 
opposition. Under its pressure the emission was increased, the state support of 
several enterprises of the military - industrial complex was expanded, the fixed 
prices were established for some products, such as gasoline. 
Nevertheless, the government of "shock therapy reformers" decided to 
conduct a second phase of changes involving the transfer of state property into 
private hands. Gaidar and Chubais were strongly influenced by those arguments 
in favor of private ownership which were associated primarily with the 
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University of Chicago (Gaidar, 1996). According to them, the transfer of private 
ownership to private hands would lead to more effective management of 
enterprises compared with the public one. As noted by M.I. Goldman (2003), in 
the early 1990s, reform economists in Eastern Europe were  often  among  the 
most fervent  advocates  of a private market economy - more so than many 
Western economists. 
However, it was not done without the help and advice of American 
specialists, as Chubais had no actual experience of economy denationalization 
(Goldman, 2003). A young Harvard University Professor Andrei Shleifer was 
invited as a counselor (Goldman, 2003). He was specializing in corporate finance 
and management. He, in his turn, invited the Russian economist Maxim Boycko, 
and a recent graduate of Harvard Law University Jonathan Hay. They 
developed a privatization program in 1995 and reported on its successful 
completion (Shenin, 2008a). Indeed, by June 1994, nearly 16,500 large and 
medium state enterprises were transferred to private hands (they formally 
became the property of the 40 million citizens of Russia). But the real results of 
privatization proved to be not so univocal. 
By estimate of J.E. Stiglitz (2002), the Nobel prize winner for economics, 
who had been working for some time in Russia in the 90-ies, privatization was 
carried too fast. When market reforms in Poland under the supervision of J. 
Sachs and D. Lipton were implemented, privatization of the public sector was 
carried out gradually, stretching for as long as the procedure of 
denationalization did not become painless for the society (Shenin, 2010). In 
Russia, where the Y. Gaidar (1996) government did not receive wide public 
support, privatization made more political than economic sense, it was necessary 
in order to deprive the opposition of the economic base. The control over the 
enterprises was given to the people who owned the insider information, close to 
the government. 
Perhaps the "shock therapy reformers" hoped for the economic instinct of 
the new owners and the effect of the Coase Theorem. According to it, it doesn't 
matter how productive assets come to private hands, they will move from one 
manager or owner to another, until they get the most productive use. That is, 
even if the company falls into the hands of "wrong people", the right of private 
property encourages new owners to the best management of assets. 
The reality was in sharp contrast with the theoretical conclusions. The new 
owners who got the property at bargain prices tried to pumped out all possible 
resources and transfer the money abroad without worrying about productivity or 
benefits growth. The action of the similar mechanisms in the Russian economy 
in the 90-ies of XX century was considered more detailed by the American 
researcher M. Goldman in "The Piratization of Russia" (Goldman, 2003). 
The economic advisors of the Russian government were involved in the 
corruption scheme. Andrei Shleifer and his wife Nancy Zimmerman began 
investing in Russian companies that were privatized with the participation of 
Shleifer (Goldman, 2003). Later the couple bought a large number of shares of 
the oil and gas sector, drawing J. Hay into this activity (Shenin, 2008b). Such 
activities were both unethical and illegal. In 1997 USAID, through which the US 
funding of technical assistance to Russian reforms was provided, initiate 
investigation concerning their activities, which resulted in a dramatic scandal. 
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After the fulfillment of the privatization program, the deal, called "loans-
for-shares", was made. In order to fill in the state budget by private funds the 
shares of companies, which were still in federal ownership (primarily in the oil 
and gas sector) were sold. Another redistribution of property happened through 
loans-for-shares auctions, which were held privately and among a small group of 
banks and industry representatives. Companies were sold at prices far below 
their real market value. Further, representatives of USAID and the IMF 
strongly justified for the fact that they allowed making such a deal, which 
questioned the legitimacy of the entire privatization program and cast some 
doubt on the professionalism and moral qualities of American economists 
worked in Russia (Stiglitz, 2002). 
Thus, the first years of reforms led to the high prices, the extinction of the 
human savings and the transfer of the state property to oligarchs. The failure of 
the reforms was demonstrated by the prolonged recession. As shown in Table 1, 
the stable economic growth began only after 1998. 
 
Table 1. Russian Economic Performance Since 1992 (Annual percentage change) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
GDP Growth 
Rates 
 
-14,5 -8,7 -12,6 -4,1 -4,9 0,8 -5,0 3,2 9 5,5 
Inflation 
Rates 
 
2525 847 223 131 48 11 84 36 20,2 15 
Source: CRS Report: RL33407 – Russia (2006).  
As the result the idea of economic reforms and the forces behind them – the 
government of Boris Yeltsin, the Western partners - was brought into discredit. 
The enthusiastic attitude of many Russians to the USA has changed by the 
disappointment and hostility. 
M. Cox (2000) wrote that the assistance provided by the USA was 
inadequate to promises, and the economic reforms conducted in the absence of 
massive financial injections, led to a rapid narrowing of the social base of these 
reforms and the Russian government. 
“The American failure, or refusal to back economic reform with massive 
injections of US money, had two rather unfortunate consequences. The first and 
least significant was to expose American rhetoric for what it was; so much hot 
air without little connection with Russian realities and needs. The second and 
more serious result, however, was to leave those who had initially backed the 
reforms inside Russia in an almost impossible position”. 
The political consequences of the failure of "shock therapy" began to appear 
in late 1992. The government of "shock therapy reformers" was dismissed by 
Boris Yeltsin (The Economist, 1993).   The appointment of the Prime Minister 
Victor Chernomyrdin was regarded by the American side as a defeat of the 
reforms, a return to centralized planning and the power of the military-
industrial complex (The Economist, 1993).  A few days after the resignation of 
Gaidar and Fyodorov the advisers J. Sachs and A. Åslund also left their posts 
(Aslund, 2002). The crisis had drawn to a head by the end of 1993, giving rise to 
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the dismissing of the Parliament by B.N. Yeltsin and the defeat of the party of 
radical reforms in the December elections. 
It is necessary to mention that the assistance was provided, though later 
than promised date. The IMF lent $3 billion to Russia in 1993–94 in the form of 
a Systematic Transformation Facility, followed by a $6.5 billion standby loan in 
1995, and a three-year loan, $18.5 billion Extended Fund Facility in 1996. The 
World Bank lent $7.8 billion to Russia in the 1990s for 33 projects, focusing on 
private sector development and infrastructure reform (such as the privatization 
of the coal industry) (Rutland, 2012).  
However, these financial injections were not very effective. Peter Rutland 
(2012) saw the main reason of it in that the Russian government violated the 
loan conditions, particularly regarding the reduction of government expenditure. 
The violation was unavoidable, the reduction in government expenditure could 
be made only through the reduction of pensions, salaries and other social 
obligations of the government, and the position of Pro-Western reformers was 
too weak to risk such radical measures. 
Meanwhile, the intensified capital outflow from Russia abroad made the 
IMF and WB not only useless but also harmful. The burden of payment on loans, 
fast transferring by the corrupt officials to offshore accounts, fell on the 
shoulders of the population. The American support was a real help, because it 
was uncompensated. The volume of the financial support from the budget of the 
United States is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Funding for Major U.S. Programs with Russia since 1992 (in billions dollars) 
Program/Fiscalyear 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Freedom Support Act 0.09 0.31 1.00 0.36 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.18 
CTR Nunn-Lugar DOD 0.01 0.17 0.26 0.15 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.39 0.43 
Agriculture 0.13 1.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 1.16 0.20 
Other 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.42 0.25 
Source: United States General Accounting Office. Foreign Assistance International Efforts to aid 
Russia’s Transition Have Had Mixed Results. (November 2000). 165p. 
The relatively large part of the allocated funds was spent on the programs 
of disarmament and humanitarian aid. As shown in Table 3, the largest amount 
of the financial assistance according to Freedom Support A was provided in 
1994-1995. It demonstrates the intention of the American administration to 
support the President Boris Yeltsin on the way of reforms, which rapidly lost 
popularity among the population of Russia. 
 
Table 3. Funds Budgeted for Freedom Support Act Assistance to Russia, Fiscal Years 1992-2000 
(in $ millions) 
Address  
/ Fiscal Years  
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Urgent Human 
Needs Related to 
Transition 
 
44,8
6 
45,41 123,3
2 
62,58 27,84 15,7
6 
18,10 28,8
0 
23,3
2 
Nonproliferation 16,1 10,25 92,28 11,50 12,00 9,50 9,05 15,4 58,3
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/ Security 
Related Items  
4 5 5 
Promote 
Democracy and 
Rule of Law  
8,05 52,86 213,3
3 
74,00 42,40 46,5
6 
57,48 72,4
4 
64,0
6 
Promote Market 
Reform  
17,5
8 
205,0
9 
572,3
0 
210,8
3 
136,6
6 
72,2
3 
125,6
9 
46,8
3 
32,5
3 
Source: United States General Accounting Office. Foreign Assistance International Efforts to aid 
Russia’s Transition Have Had Mixed Results. (November 2000). 170p. 
Even this rather limited financial and technical assistance became the 
reason for critics of President Clinton’s policy towards Russia by the 
conservatives during the elections in 1996. The editor’s article in “The 
Economist” urged to look more attentively at the Russian domestic policy and to 
cease to support Boris Yeltsin only for fear of communism return.  Pointing to 
contradictory results of the Russian reforms, the magazine urged not to include 
Russia in the activity of the G7 and cooperation with NATO (The Economist, 
1995). 
The leaders of Congress opposition Robert Dole, Richard Cheney, James 
Baker and well-known politician Henry Kissinger accused the inefficient 
Clinton’s policy in pouring the American taxpayers’ money into the "rat holes" of 
the Kremlin without effective influence on the economic situation in the RF (The 
Washington Post, 1996). In opinion of the opposition representatives, there was 
no middle class in Russia which would guarantee the continuous movement of 
the reforms in the country. The policy of Russia’s involvement in the activity of 
international organizations (such as G7) had born the illusions of Russia’s status 
as the superpower.  
The problem was so serious that it had been discussed at Hearings before 
the Congress in July, 1996 (Hearing, 1996). All attendees agreed with the 
opinion of the ambassador J. Collins that the policy of helping the Russian 
reforms brings benefits to the USA, doing the world safer and more stable, and 
Russia made great steps on the way to democracy. But it was noted that 
Yeltsin's government used the allocated funds inexpediently, and the reduction 
of the population’s support compelled the Russian government to come back to 
the elements of a planned economy. 
To the second presidential election in Russia it became clear that Russia’s 
transition to capitalism with the assistance of Washington and the IMF turned 
bad. According to J.E. Stiglitz (2002): “radical reform strategy did not work: 
gross domestic product in the post-1989 Russia fell year after year. The 
stabilization/liberalization/privatization program was intended to set the 
preconditions for growth. Instead, it set the preconditions for decline. Not only 
was investments haltered, but capital was used up – savings vaporized by 
inflation, the proceedes of privatization or foreign loans largely 
misappropriated”. He believed that the Clinton administration’s Treasury and 
IMF experts misunderstood the real situation in the country, where the 
corruption was too disseminated to allow market economy work in a proper way.  
To manage the situation Western partners turned from federal center to 
Russian regions. It was decided to implement the Regional Investment Initiative 
Program which included financial, informational and technical support to 
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several regions of the Russian Federation with the aim of attracting foreign 
investments there (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1997). 
Differences in industrial development of various regions of the Russian 
Federation, supplying with natural and human resources predetermined various 
degree of their appeal to the foreign capital. It should be mentioned that there 
were a few regions with stable economic situation. Only 11 from 89 subjects of 
the Russian Federation were the "donors" of the federal budget. The number of 
the regions attractive to foreign investments was also very small. In 1995 eight 
Russian regions (Moscow, Tyumen Region, the Republic of Tatarstan, Nizhny 
Novgorod Region, Samara Region, St. Petersburg, Sakhalin Region and Tomsk 
Region) attracted 77,1% of all foreign investments (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 1996). 
Moscow, large machine-building centers, raw regions and regions most closely 
located to foreign investors took the leading places in foreign investments inflow. 
At the beginning of the RII program it was decided to implement it in two 
regions: Novgorod Region and the Far East (Khabarovsk territory). Obviously, 
they were not leading regions such as Moscow or Leningrad areas but rather 
stable with high income level of the population. Other peculiarities of these 
regions were the American-Russian trade and highly developed economic 
relations on their territories. The choice of the regions was also guided by the 
commitment of their governors to western democratic values and the tendency to 
carry out market reforms and by the real economic potential and experience of 
cooperation already existing in the region with the American business. In 1997 
the choice was made in favour of Samara region. 
Though the political relations between the USA and Russia in 1995-96 were 
rather cold, the shift of attention of the American administration from the 
federal center to the province opened many prospects for Russian regions’ 
economic growth.  
On the territory of Samara region the RII project included the programs for 
business development such as financing of small and middle business, 
consulting services, regional development and attraction of investments, support 
of democratic initiatives (including the anti-corruption program), strengthening 
of social sector and health care, development of non-profit organizations and 
regional mass media, education and professional trainings for the specialists of 
various branches. About US $23 million were spent for these programs by the 
American partners and the Samara region government. 
The program which supported the use and application of the Internet 
technology for the US-Russian collaboration can be considered the most 
successful. It increased public access to Email and the Internet through the 
establishment of seven Public Access Internet Centers. The exchange programs 
which allowed students and lecturers of the Russian Universities to train or 
conduct researches in the USA were of special importance. Carried out with 
financial support of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and administration of IREX (International Research & Exchanges 
Board) they considerably expanded possibilities of interpersonal 
communications.  
Formally, the RII program was carried out till 2002 but its most essential 
projects took place till the end of the nineties. It was influenced by the 
deterioration of the economic situation in Russia and the USA and intensive 
growth of tension in bilateral ties at the state level. The crisis of 1998 made the 
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great impact on the international activity of the Russian regions. It did not 
affect the development of extracting industries, however, the income of 
manufacturing industries was strongly reduced. The direct foreign investments 
in the Russian economy were reduced too. That is why the results of the main 
trend of the Regional Investment Initiative (to promote economic growth in the 
Russian regions) became unclear. 
The sharpening of the American-Russian relationships at the state level 
was also harmful. At the end of the nineties each of the sides had got serious 
reasons to suspect each other in bad intentions. NATO expansion to the East 
which began in 1996 revived traditional and quite reasonable fears of Russia for 
safety of its own territory. As S. Talbott (2002) wrote in The Russia Hand. A 
Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy, Clinton’s conception of NATO considered 
Russia’s accession in the future but in 1996 NATO’s expansion was the main 
reason of tension in the US-Russian relations. 
Simultaneously promoting financial and technical assistance to RF the USA 
limited the flow of the Russian goods such as products of ferrous and nonferrous 
metallurgy and space branch on the American market (Crock, 1999). At the 
same time, the cooperation of Russia with Iran developing nuclear program was 
a sore subject for the United States (‘Russia’, CRS Report: IB92089, 2001). At 
last, the conflict in Kosovo and the American bombings of Serbia caused too 
negative reaction of Russia (Talbott, 2002). 
On the 24th of March 1999 the Russian Prime Minister Evgeniy Primakov 
was flying to Washington to co-chair the Gor-Primakov Comission Summit 
(Lapskii, 1999). He ordered to turn the plane back to Moscow when he learned 
the US wouldn’t stop bombing Serbia even during the Summit. The Prime 
Minister’s reaction caused the failure of regular session of the bilateral Gore-
Primakov Commission, that is why the consequences of this situation were 
rather unfavourable. Though the majority of the RII projects had already been 
either fulfilled or put in work, the conflict in political relations discredited the 
results of the Program and in many ways predetermined its ending.  
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the new administrations of 
Vladimir Putin in Russia and George Walker Bush in the USA came to power. It 
started a new stage in the US-Russian relations, though it began with the 
internal transformations in Russia. The reform of local government which 
considerably strengthened the control of the federal center over the regions was 
carried out. This policy caused the concerns of Russia’s return to 
authoritarianism.  
The economic growth allowed the Russian government to refuse the 
American support. Further activity of the American non-profit organizations 
such as the Peace Corp or the Open Society Foundation were forbidden in 
Russia. Unfortunately, it meant the impossibility of carrying out the RII 
program in other Russian regions. Tomsk region which was included in RII in 
1999 did not receive technical assistance from the USA because there was no 
opportunity of its implementation in 2001. 
Conclusion 
Considering the American assistance to the Russian reforms in the 1990-s, 
we can conclude that the huge US influence on the Russian domestic policy in 
this period is obvious. However, it would be a significant simplification to 
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consider that the cause of all the expenses of economic transformation such as 
the fall in living standards, stagnation, inflation and the corruption growth was 
the plan of the US Administration for the collapse of the post-Soviet Russian 
economy. Many other factors of history, culture, economy and geopolitics also 
have played a negative role. 
Justifying the strategy of "shock therapy", the supporters of the neoliberal 
approach, especially George Sachs, Peter Rutland (2012) and others indicate 
that it was not fully implemented in the country, moreover, it did not even start. 
The government costs and the money creation were not cut, the subsidies for 
uncompetitive companies continued under the pressure of the opposition. In the 
absence of massive financial support the Executive branch had to retreat from 
the course of radical reforms. 
J.E. Stiglitz (2002) thinks that one of the reasons for the reforms failure 
was the improvidence of the American side, which was pushing the Russian 
government to a quick transformation in the absence of a legal base for a market 
economy and protection of private property. The researcher addresses a greater 
reproach to the neo-liberal strategy itself, indicating that the market opening for 
foreign goods in a developing country leads to the suppression of the national 
production, and it was clearly demonstrated by the Russian experience. 
In the 90-s of XX century the American-Russian relations were unstable, 
partly due to the lack of deep economic affairs, trade and investment 
cooperation. Each of the parties overestimated the capabilities of the partner. 
Nevertheless, the important positive results of the US assistance to the 
Russian regions were the knowledge and skills received by young specialists in 
the field of entrepreneurship, voluntary work, work in information systems. RII 
Programs smoothed the informational and technological gaps between the 
Russian province, closed in the years of the cold war, and developed countries, 
between provincial cities and Moscow. 
Disclosure statement 
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. 
Notes on contributors 
Yuliya A. Tarasova is Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of 
Syzran Branch of Samara State University of Economics, Syzran, Russia. 
Lyubov S. Bolshakova is chair of Law and Social-Economic Disciplines, Associate 
Professor of Syzran Branch of Samara State University of Economics, Syzran, Russia. 
Igor A. Yasenitsky is chair of Law and Social-Economic Disciplines, Associate 
Professor of Russian State Vocational Pedagogical University, Ekaterinburg, Russia. 
Marija B. Larionova is Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of 
Russian State Vocational Pedagogical University, Ekaterinburg, Russia. 
References 
Aslund A. (2002) Building Capitalism: the Transformation of the former Soviet Block. Cambridge, 
Cambridge Press, 75 p. 
Batalov, A. Ya. & Kremenyuk, V. A. (2002). Russia and the USA: Rivals or Partners? SShA, Kanada: 
Economika. Politika. Kultura, 6, 19-36.  
Bogdanov, I. Y. (2015). Assessment and evolution of poverty in modern russia. Vestnik of Samara 
State University of Economics, 3. 158. 
 
 
 
 
7714  Y. A. TARASOVA ET AL. 
Cohen, St. (2000). Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia. New York, 
London: Norton. 304p. 
Cox, M. (2000). From the Cold War to Strategic Partnership? US-Russian Relations since the End of 
the USSR. In M. Boker, C. Ross (Eds.). Russia after the Cold War. London: Longman, 335 p. 
Crock, S. (1999). Washington Is Making It Hard For Russia to Help Itself. The Business Week, 
February 8, 57-58. 
Gaidar, Y. (1996). Days of Defeat and Victory. Moscow: Vagrius, 365 p. 
Getting Russia Right. The West needs to take a new hard look. (1995). The Economist, 14, 23-25. 
Goldman, M. I. (2003). The Piratization of Russia. Russian reform goes awry. London, New York: 
Routledge, 297 p. 
Joint Statement on United States-Russia Economic Initiative. March 21, 1997. (1998). Public Papers 
of the Presidents of the United States, Washington, D.C., 345 p. 
Lapskii, V. (1999). Itak, Primakov v Vashingtone. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 4, 24-26.  
Nye, J. S. (2002). The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It 
Alone. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 240 p. 
Papp, D. (1997). Contemporary International Relations. Frameworks for Understanding. Boston: 
Pearson,560 p. 
Republican Foreign Policy Gurus Attack the Administration’s Competence. (1996). The Washington 
Post, April 7, 34-35. 
Russia CRS Report: IB92089. (2001). Direct access: http: // digital library. unt.edu 
/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-1754:1  
Russia CRS Report. RL33407 (2006). Direct access:   http: // digital library. unt.edu 
/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-1823:1 
The Economist Russia. (1993). Hard Pounding. The Economist, 337N7811, 28-36. 
Russia’s Election: What does it Mean? (1996). Hearing before the Comission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, July 10? Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 84 p. 
Rutland, P. (2012). Neoloberalism and the Russian Transition, Review of International Political 
Economy, 23. 278-284. 
Sachs, J.D. (1997). When Foreign Aid Makes Difference. The New York Times, 3, 17-19. 
Shakleina, T. A. (2006). Russia and the USA in World Politics. Economika. Politika. Kultura, 9, 3-18. 
Shenin, S. Y. (2010). Sachs and American aid to the post-soviet Russia:the case of “different 
anatomy”, Izvestiya of Saratov University. History. International Relations, 10(1). 99-107. 
Shenin, S. Yu. (2008a). Return to Russia. Strategy and Policy of the American Help. St.Petersburg: 
Philological Faculty of St. Petersburg State University. 335p. 
Shenin, S. Yu. (2008b). The Harvard’s «Russian Project»: from Triumph to Disgrace. Izvestiya of 
Saratov University. History. International Relations, 8(2). 27-33. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its Discontents. London: Penguin Books. 145p. 
Talbott, S. (2002). The Russia Hand. A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy. NewYork: Random House, 
512 p. 
The Economy of Member Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991.  (1992). 
Moscow: Information and publishing center of Goskomstat, 33p. 
United States General Accounting Office. (2000). Foreign Assistance International Efforts to aid 
Russia’s Transition Have Had Mixed Results. Washington: 165p. 
Utkin, A. I. (2003). The American Empire. Eksmo: Moscow. 736p. 
 
